RSVP and RSVP-TE are signalingprotocols used to set up paths andor support Quality of Service (QoS) requirements in IP and WLS-bused networkr, respectively. This puper anahzes an auihenrication mechanism for securing the RSVP and RSVP-TE control messages, and studies their performance. This design and implementation of the authenticaiion mechanism. which is bused on RFC2747, using four con"nly adopted hash algorithms -MR5, RIPEMD160, SHA-I, and SHA-256, not onIy improves securify, but also provides useful information from the performance aspect. The time for authenticating the signaling messages depends on the algorithm used, and increases slightly in the order of MD.5, SHA-I, RPEMD160
Introduction
With the emergence of the distributed multimedia applications such as audiohideo conferencing, the traditional networks based on the besteffort service delivery model could not satisfy the requirements of the real-time performance needed by these applications. Resource
Reservation Protocol (RSVP) [1,2] provides one of the solutions in IP networks by setting up network bandwidth reservation. RSVP-TE is an extension of the RSVP protocol, which is used in Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLSFbased networks to establish and maintain explicitly routed Label Switched Paths (LSPs). MPLS has received tremendous attention in both industry and academia for its ability to support traffic engineering, protection and restoration, and virtual private networks. Along with the increased connectivity and new services, computer networks have also allowed technically advanced intruders opportunities to carry out a variety of attacks that threaten the integrity of its infrastructure and violate the privacy of its users p,4]. Corrupted Replay; Traffic Analysis; and Denial of Service. Current efforts to make the RSVP protocol more secure is not only far from complete, but also not yet thorough. Since the specification of the RSVP [Z] became an IETF standard in 1997 [ 13, less attention has been paid to this area.
The security services with RSVP assure the integrity and authenticity of services in networks. However, the overhead required by the RSVP message flow, the traffic scheduling procedure and its security mechanisms actually degrade the performance of the network [7, 8] . It 
RSVP and RSVP-TE protocols
RSVP is a signaling protocol used to request specific QoS from the network for data flow and by a router to deliver QoS requests to all nodes along the path(s} of the data flow. It is also used for routers to establish and maintain the requested service. The QoS parameters, such as bandwidth, are processed by a traffic control module that includes: (1) a packet classifier, (2) admission control, and (3) a packet scheduler. After being analyzed and processed by the traffic control module, the reserved information such as bandwidth and buffer space is sent to RSVP for processing reservation. RSVP is receiver-oriented; the receiver of the data flow is responsible for the initiation of the resource reservation. Periodically, the RSVP process at a router scans the path state to create a new PATH message to be forwarded to the neighboring router along a path to the receiver. And then the receiver periodically sends a RESV message to establish and update the reservation state. The reservation state will be automatically invalidated after timeout unless the RESV signal is refreshed. 
Authenticating RSVP and RSVP-TE messages
There are three main security concerns for RSVP: 1) Message integrity and node authentication; 2) User authentication; 3 ) Secure data stream [I] . In concern with the message integrity and node authentication, security protocols of SDSiCD [ 5 ] , RSVP-SQoS [6] and hop-by-hop authentication were proposed. Wu et al. Authentication of the RSVP [l] uses the embedded N T E G R I T Y object in the RSVP message in a hop-by-hop manner. The specific security goals are as follows:
Prevention of forgery and modification of RSVP and RSVP-TE messages ; Data origin authentication of sending routers; and Prevention of message replay In this work, the authentication mechanism is implemented and conforms to RFC 2747. The INTEGRITY object carries an authenticating digest of the RSVP message, computed using a secret authentication key and a keyed-hash algorithm. It is also tagged with a one-time-use sequence number, which allows the message receiver to identify playbacks and hence to thwart replay attacks.
The security strength of the authentication mechanism is based on two aspects: the strength of the algorithm and the length of the key. In RSVP message authentication, the authentication algorithm was suggested to use hash algorithms and required to be altered in case of a security breach [IO] . In MD4 family, due to the fact that MD4 and RIPEMD have lost their significance in application eefer discussion in Section 2.4.1), there is a need to select algorithms with different lengths of digest and different complexities. MD5 has l6byte digest and is the most popular hash function used today although one of its properties, collision resistant, is breached [ 1 11. Research showed that it did not pose a threat in actual applications [12, 13] . SHA-t conforms to the F P S PUB 180-1 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) with 20-byte long digest, while SHA-256 conforms to the FIPS PUB 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) with 32-byte long digest [14] . RIPEMD160 is developed with 2Gbyte long digest. Among these algorithms, no breach of RTPEMD160, SHA-I and SHA-256 has been found to date. In this work, the standard implementations were used for the experiments.
Secret keys were used for the authentication. They were generated by a randompseudo number generator. Keys with lengths of 8, 16, 32 and 64 bytes were generated during experiments. 30 to 1100 keys (each has its own key id) were generated for changing keys when the current key exceeds its lifetime. The number of keys is also one of the security parameters. The key management, including key generation, storage, distributiodtransfer, and deletion, is an important and challenging issue in cryptosystems, In this work, the authentication algorithms use the secret key mechanism, and the key is distributed in the network by the operator. Other factors of keys such as more secure distribution and storage are not within the scope of this study. 2.3 Performance measurements Network topology. Figure 1 illustrates Rgure I Network topology for the esperiment RO, R1, and R2 all represent either IP routers or label switched routers (LSRs). The incoming and outgoing IP-address interfaces of the routers are also shown in Figure  1 . The parameters of the computers that run these router programs are shown in Table 1 . 
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Methodology. In this work, various processing times were measured and are described in Table 2 . 
Time for Generating Message Digest
The time for authenticating the RSVP PATH message and generating its message digest was measured (for & and thereafter, if not otherwise specified), as shown in Figure 2 . It can be seen that MD5 has the shortest time of generating the message digest and encoding the whole PATH messages, and SHA-256 has the longest. SHA-256 has the longest hash value, at 32 bytes, and the most complicated block processing procedures among these hash algorithms. Thus SHA-256 is the most secure, but brings more overhead. The time for generating the message digest is 94 psec, 137 psec, 118 psec, and 213 psec, respectively, for MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA-1 and SHA-256. It can be seen that the time for encoding and decoding a PATH message varies for different algorithms; and the decoding time is shorter than the encoding time. This occurred when encoding a PATH message, because extra operations, such as encoding the RSVP-OBJ header and generating a sequence number, were undertaken. 
Time for Authenticating RESV Messages
It can be seen that the times for encoding and decoding RESV messages are almost the same, about 387 psec, and almost independent of the algorithms in this experiment environment. This indicates that the algorithms can be equally selected in terms of the time for encoding/decoding the RESV messages. In IP networks, the reservation state is set up through timely refreshes between senders and receivers for the reservation connection. The RSVP message connection setup time can be defined as the delay between the time the sender first detects a PATH message and the time the sender receives a RESV message. The connection setup time for RSVP messages can be affected by the time for key generation, message digest computation, PATH message encoding and decoding, and RESV message encoding and decoding. From the measurement results, the time required for authenticating RSVP messages varies with different authentication kky parameters and authentication algorithms.
For a certain key used, the connection setup time could increase in an order of MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMDT60, and SHA-256 if other factors in the network are the same.
Performance Analysis of Authenticating RSVP-TE Messages
The authentication mechanism is integrated into the RSVP-TE protocol to authenticate the signaling messages of RSVP-TE. Compared with RSVP messages, the additional objects of EXPLICIT-OBJ, LABEL-REQUEST -OBJ, and RECORD_ROUTE-OBJ are added to the RSVP-TE PATH and RESV messages. As is known, the time for generating authentication keys and message digest is only dependent on the authentication mechanism itself, and is independent of the protocoIs of RSVP or RSVP-TE. Thus, for RSVP-TE protocol, only the time for authenticating RSVP-TE PATH and RESV messages and the time for RSVP-TE connection setup were measured, which is shown below. PATH message with different algorithms Figure 5 shows that the time for encoding RSW-TE PATH message is larger than that of decoding. And the times required for encoding and decoding RSVP-TE PATH messages are almost independent of the algorithms within the experimental error, which is similar to that of decoding RSVP message, shown in Figure 3 .
Connection Setup Time for RSVP-TE Messages
The connection setup time (AT) for RSVP-TE messages in setting up an LSP in MPLS-based network is defined as the delay between the time the sender first detects a PATH message and the time the sender first receives a RESV message. The first PATH and RESV messages of a session were measured. In this experiment, the connection setup time was measured both with and without the authentication mechanism in RSVP-TE messages, designated AA and Am, respectively. When there is only one session and the authentication mechanism is disabled in the network, the connection setup time was AM = 57.3 msec for RSVP-TE.
The connection setup time was AA 61.7 msec when the authentication mechanism was enabled with MD5. The time ratio (4) of the authentication mechanism versus the mechanism without authentication was calculated 8s:
$ AA /ANA (Eq. 1) The time ratio for setting up an LSP by RSVP-TE messages is 1.08 when there is only one session in the network. Multiple sessions were then set up, and only one LSP was established in each session. The connection setup time of an RSW-TE message was measured for different number of sessions. Figure 6 shows the average connection setup time of an RSVP-TE message as a function of the number of sessions with and without authentication mechanism. It can be seen that the connection setup time increases as the number of sessions increases. The time ratio, 4, was calculated and shown in Table 3 with R-squared value of 0.98. The estimated time ratio, heal, of the connection setup time was calculated from the fitting curves using Eq. 2 and Eq. 3, respectively, and was also shown in Table 3 for MD5. The estimated time ratio qualitatively decreases as the number of session increases. The connection setup time was also measured for other authentication algorithms of RIPEMD160, SHA-1, and SHA-256. The average connection setup times using different authentication algorithms show similar behaviors with the increase in the number of sessions. The least square fits were also applied to these algorithms. Results of the estimate time ratios, kal, together with the measured time ratios, 4, are shown in Table. 3 for different authentication algorithms at a selective number of sessions. The measured data from Table 3 were obtained under the same experimental conditions and reflects quantitatively the change of the time ratio with the number sessions using different authentication algorithms.
3 . Discussioa on Authenticating RSVP-TE Protocols
Different from RSVP, where the sender sends the PATH messages and the receiver sends the RESV messages along a hop-by-hop path, the RSVP-TE is used to set up an LSP on an explicit route. The ingress sends out the route information in a PATH message to request label binding from the egress. Upon receiving the PATH message, the RSVP-TE RESV message distributes labels upstream along the explicit route.
By authenticating the PATH and RESV messages, the explicit route information (included in EXPLICIT-ROUTE object), the labels of the LSP, and resource reservation parameters such as bandwidth are authenticated. This contributes to the security assurance of the MPLS networks.
Summary
Security is crucial in communications networks. This paper investigated security aspect of the RSVP and RSVP-TE protocols used in IP and MPLS networks, respectively; because both protocols are used for network control purpose. The paper discussed how to incorporate the authentication mechanism into the protocols. Four different commonly used hash algorithms -MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA-1, and SHA-256 -were implemented for performance evaluation. The results can be used for reference if authentication is considered for these two protocols.
